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1 Introduction
Vertical relationships between manufacturers and retailers seem to be more and more
important in the supermarket industry and in particular in food retailing. Competition
analysis and issues related to market power on some consumption goods markets should
involve the analysis of competition between producers but also between retailers and the
whole structure of the industry. Consumer welfare depends crucially on these strategic ver-
tical relationships and the competition or collusion degree of manufacturers and retailers.
The aim of this paper is thus to develop a methodology allowing to estimate alternative
structural models where the role of manufacturers and retailers is explicit in the horizontal
and vertical strategic behaviors. Previous work on these issues generally does not account
for the behavior of retailers in the manufacturers pricing strategies. One of the reasons is
that information on wholesale prices and marginal costs of production or distribution are
generally difficult to obtain and methods relying on demand side data, where only retail
prices are observed, require the structural modelling of vertical contracts between manu-
facturers and retailers in an oligopoly model. Following Rosse (1970), researchers have thus
tried to develop methodologies allowing to estimate price-cost margins that are necessary
for market power analysis and policy simulations, using only data on the demand side, i.e.
sales quantities, market shares and retail prices. Empirical industrial organization methods
propose to address this question with the estimation of structural models of competition
on differentiated products markets (see, for example, Berry, 1994, Berry, Levinsohn and
Pakes, 1995, and Nevo, 1998, 2000, 2001, Ivaldi and Verboven, 2001 on markets such
as cars, computers, and breakfast cereals). Until recently, most papers in this literature
assume that manufacturers set prices and that retailers act as neutral pass-through inter-
mediaries or that they charge exogenous constant margins. However, it seems unlikely that
retailers do not use some strategic pricing. Chevalier, Kashyap and Rossi (2003) show the
important role of distributors on prices through the use of data on wholesale and retail
prices. Actually, the strategic role of retailers has been emphasized only recently in the
empirical economics and marketing literatures. Goldberg and Verboven (2001), Mortimer
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(2004), Sudhir (2001), Berto Villas Boas (2004) or Villas-Boas and Zhao (2004) introduce
retailers’ strategic behavior. For instance, Sudhir (2001) considers the strategic interac-
tions between manufacturers and a single retailer on a local market and focuses exclusively
on a linear pricing model leading to double marginalization. These recent developments
introducing retailers’ strategic behavior consider mostly cases where competition between
producers and/or retailers remains under linear pricing. Berto Villas-Boas (2004) extends
the Sudhir’s framework to multiple retailers and considers the possibility that vertical
contracts between manufacturers and retailers make pricing strategies depart from double
marginalization by setting alternatively wholesale margins or retail margins to zero. Using
recent theoretical developments due to Rey and Vergé (2004) that characterize pricing
equilibria in the case of competition under non linear pricing between manufacturers and
retailers (namely two part tariffs with or without resale price maintenance), we extend
the analysis taking explicitly into account vertical contracts between manufacturers and
retailers.
We then present how to test across different hypothesis on the strategic relationships
between manufacturers and retailers in the supermarket industry competing on a dif-
ferentiated products market. In particular, we consider two types of non linear pricing
relationships, one where resale price maintenance is used with two part tariffs contracts
and one where no resale price maintenance is allowed in two part tariffs (Rey and Vergé,
2004). Modelling explicitly optimal two part tariffs contracts (with or without resale price
maintenance) allows to recover the pricing strategy of manufacturers and retailers and
thus the total price-cost margins as functions of demand parameters without observing
wholesale prices. Using non nested test procedures, we show how to test between the dif-
ferent models using exogenous variables that shift the marginal costs of production and
distribution.
We apply this methodology to study the market for retailing bottled water in France
and present the first formal empirical tests of such a model including non linear contracts
between manufacturers and retailers. This market presents a high degree of concentration
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both at the manufacturer and retailer levels. It is to be noted that it is actually even more
concentrated at the manufacturer level. Our empirical evidence shows that, in the French
bottled water market, manufacturers and retailers use non linear pricing contracts and in
particular two part tariffs contracts with resale price maintenance. At last, we also show
how to simulate counterfactual policies with our structural model that consist in changing
the ownership of products between manufacturers and retailers.
In section 2, we first present some stylized facts on the market for bottled water
in France, an industry where the questions of vertical relationships and competition of
manufacturers and retailers seem worth studying. Section 3 presents the main methodo-
logical contribution on the supply side. We show how price-cost margins can be recovered
with demand parameters, in particular when taking explicitly into account two part ta-
riffs contracts. Section 4 presents the demand model, its identification and the estimation
method proposed as well as the testing method between the different models. Section 5
presents the empirical results, tests and simulations. A conclusion with future research
directions is in section 6, and some appendices follow.
2 Stylized Facts on the Market for Bottled Water in France
The French market for bottled water is one of the more dynamic sector of the French
food processing industry : the total production of bottled water has increased by 4% in
2000, and its turnover by 8%. Some 85% of French consumers drink bottled water, and over
two thirds of French bottled water drinkers drink it more than once a day, a proportion ex-
ceeded only in Germany. The French bottled water sector is a highly concentrated sector,
the first three main manufacturers (Nestlé Waters, Danone, and Castel) sharing 90% of the
total production of the sector. Moreover, given the scarcity of natural springs, entry both
for mineral or spring water is rather difficult in this market where there exist some natural
capacity constraints. Compte, Jenny and Rey (2002) comment on the Nestlé/Perrier Mer-
ger case that took place in 1992 in Europe and point out that these capacity constraints are
a factor of collusion by themselves in addition to the high concentration of the sector. This
sector can be divided in two major segments : mineral water and spring water. Natural
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mineral water benefits some properties favorable to health, which are officially recognized.
Composition must be guaranteed as well as the consistency of a set of qualitative criteria :
mineral content, visual aspects, and taste. The mineral water can be marketed if it re-
ceives an agreement from the French Ministry of Health. The exploitation of a spring water
source requires only a license provided by local authorities (Prefectures) and a favorable
opinion of the local health committee. Moreover, the water composition is not required
to be constant. The differences between the quality requirements involved in the certifica-
tion of the two kinds of bottled water may explain part of the large difference that exists
between the shelf prices of the national mineral water brands and the local spring water
brands. Moreover, national mineral water brands are highly advertised. The bottled water
products use mainly two kinds of differentiation. The first kind of differentiation stems
from the mineral composition, that is the mineral salts content, and the second from the
brand image conveyed through advertising. Actually, thanks to data at the aggregate level
(Agreste, 1999, 2000, 2002) on food industries and the bottled water industry, one can
remark (see the following Table) that this industry uses much more advertising than other
food industries. Friberg and Ganslandt (2003) report an advertising to revenue ratio for
the same industry in Sweden, i.e., 6.8% over the 1998-2001 period. For comparison, the
highest advertising to revenue ratio in the US food processing industry corresponds to the
ready-to-eat breakfast cereal industry and is of 10.8%. These figures may be interpreted
as showing the importance of horizontal differentiation of products for bottled water.
Year Bottled Water All Food Industries
PCM Advertising/Revenue PCM Advertising/Revenue
1998 17.38% 12.09% 6.32% 5.57%
1999 16.70% 14.91% 6.29% 6.81%
2000 13.61% 15.89% 3.40% 8.76%
Table : Aggregate Estimates of Margins and Advertising to Sales Ratios.
These aggregate data also allow to compute some accounting price-cost margins1 defi-
ned as value added2 (V A) minus payroll (PR) and advertising expenses (AD) divided by
1The underlying assumptions in the definition of these price-cost margins are that the marginal cost is
constant and is equal to the average variable cost (see Liebowitz, 1982).
2Value added is defined as the value of shipments plus services rendered minus cost of materials, supplies
and containers, fuel, and purchased electrical energy.
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the value of shipments (TR). As emphasized by Nevo (2001), these accounting estimates
can be considered as an upper bound to the true price-cost margins.
Recently, the degradation of the distribution network of tap water has led to an increase
of bottled water consumption. This increase benefited to the cheapest bottled water, that
is to the local spring water. For instance, the total volume of local spring water sold in
2000 reached closely the total volume of mineral water sold the same year. Households buy
bottled water mostly in supermarkets : some 80% of the total sales of bottled water comes
from supermarkets. Moreover, on average, these sales represent 1.7% of the total turnover
of supermarkets, the bottled water shelf being one of the most productive. French bottled
water manufacturers thus deal mainly their brands through retailing chains. These chains
are also highly concentrated, the market share of the first five accounting for 80.7% of total
food product sales. Moreover, these late years, like other processed food products, these
chains have developed private labels to attract consumers. The increase in the number of
private labels tends to be accompanied by a reduction of the market shares of the main
national brands.
We thus face a relatively concentrated market for which the questions of whether or
not producers may exert bargaining power in their strategic relationships with retailers is
important. The study of competition issues and evaluation of markups, which is crucial
for consumer welfare, has then to take into account the possibility that non linear pricing
may be used between manufacturers and retailers. Two part tariffs are typically relatively
simple contracts that may allow manufacturers to benefit from their bargaining position
in selling national brands. Therefore, we study in the next section different alternative
models of strategic relationships between multiple manufacturers and multiple retailers
that are worth considering.
3 Competition and Vertical Relationships Between Manu-
facturers and Retailers
Before presenting our demand model, we present now the modelling of the competition
and vertical relationships between manufacturers and retailers. Given the structure of the
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bottled water industry and the retail industry in France, we consider several oligopoly
models with different vertical relationships. More precisely, we show how each supply
model can be solved to obtain an expression for both the retailer’s and manufacturer’s
price-cost margins just as a function of demand side parameters. Then using estimates
of a differentiated products demand model, we will be able to estimate empirically these
price-cost margins and we will show how we can test between these competing scenarios. A
similar methodology has been used already for double marginalization scenarios considered
below by Sudhir (2001) or Brenkers and Verboven (2004) or Berto Villas-Boas (2004) but
none of the papers in this literature already considered the particular case of competition
in two part tariffs using the recent theoretical insights of Rey and Vergé (2004).
Let’s first introduce the notations. There are J differentiated products defined by the
couple product-retailer corresponding to J 0 national brands and J − J 0 private labels.
We suppose there are R retailers competing in the retail market and F manufacturers
competing in the wholesale market. We denote by Sr the set of products sold by retailer r
and by Ff the set of products produced by firm f . In the following we present successively
the different oligopoly models that we want to study.
3.1 Linear Pricing and Double Marginalization
In this model, the manufacturers set their prices first, and retailers follow, setting the
retail prices given the wholesale prices. For private labels, prices are chosen by the retailer
himself who acts as doing both manufacturing and retailing. We consider that competition
is à la Nash-Bertrand. We solve this vertical model by backward induction considering the
retailer’s problem. The profit Πr of retailer r in a given period (we drop the time subscript
t for ease of presentation) is given by
Πr =
X
j∈Sr
(pj −wj − cj)sj(p)M
where pj is the retail price of product j sold by retailer r, wj is the wholesale price paid
by retailer r for product j, cj is the retailer’s (constant) marginal cost of distribution for
product j, sj(p) is the market share of product j, p is the vector of all products retail
prices and M is the size of the market. Assuming that a pure-strategy Bertrand-Nash
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equilibrium in prices exists and that equilibrium prices are strictly positive, the price of
any brand j sold by retailer r must satisfy the first-order condition
sj +
X
k∈Sr
(pk −wk − ck)
∂sk
∂pj
= 0, for all j ∈ Sr. (1)
Now, we define Ir (of size (J × J)) as the ownership matrix of the retailer r that is
diagonal and whose elements Ir(j, j) are equal to 1 if the retailer r sells products j and
zero otherwise. Let Sp be the market shares response matrix to retailer prices, containing
the first derivatives of all market shares with respect to all retail prices, i.e.
Sp ≡
⎛
⎜⎝
∂s1
∂p1 . . .
∂sJ
∂p1
...
...
∂s1
∂pJ . . .
∂sJ
∂pJ
⎞
⎟⎠
In vector notation, the first order condition (1) implies that the vector γ of retailer r’s
margins, i.e. the retail price p minus the wholesale price w minus the marginal cost of
distribution c, is3
γ ≡ p−w − c = − (IrSpIr)−1 Irs(p) (2)
Remark that for private labels, this price-cost margin is in fact the total price cost margin
p−µ−c which amounts to replace the wholesale price w by the marginal cost of production
µ in this formula.
Concerning the manufacturers’ behavior, we also assume that each of them maximize
profit choosing the wholesale prices wj of the product j he sells and given the retailers’
response (1). The profit of manufacturer f is given by
Πf =
X
j∈Ff
(wj − µj)sj(p(w))M
where µj is the manufacturer’s (constant) marginal cost of production of product j. As-
suming the existence of a pure-strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in wholesale prices
between manufacturers, the first order conditions are
sj +
X
k∈Ff
X
l=1,..,J
(wk − µk)
∂sk
∂pl
∂pl
∂wj
= 0, for all j ∈ Ff . (3)
3Remark that in all the following, when we use the inverse of non invertible matrices, it means that we
consider the matrix of generalized inverse which means that for example
∙
2 0
0 0
¸−1
=
∙
1/2 0
0 0
¸
.
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Consider If the ownership matrix of manufacturer f that is diagonal and whose element
If (j, j) is equal to one if j is produced by the manufacturer f and zero otherwise. We
introduce Pw the (J × J) matrix of retail prices responses to wholesale prices, containing
the first derivatives of the J retail prices p with respect to the J 0 wholesale prices w.
Pw ≡
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
∂p1
∂w1 ..
∂pJ
∂wJ0
.. ∂pJ∂w1
...
...
...
∂p1
∂wJ0 ..
∂pJ0
∂wJ0
.. ∂pJ∂wJ0
0 .. 0 .. 0
0 .. 0 .. 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Remark that the last J−J 0 lines of this matrix are zero because they correspond to private
labels products for which wholesale prices have no meaning.
Then, we can write the first order conditions (3) in matrix form and the vector of manu-
facturer’s margins is4
Γ ≡ w − µ = −(IfPwSpIf )−1Ifs(p) (4)
The first derivatives of retail prices with respect to wholesale prices depend on the strategic
interactions between manufacturers and retailers. Let’s assume that the manufacturers set
the wholesale prices and retailers follow, setting the retail prices given the wholesale prices.
Therefore, Pw can be deduced from the differentiation of the retailer’s first order conditions
(1) with respect to wholesale price, i.e. for j ∈ Sr and k = 1, .., J 0
X
l=1,..,J
∂sj(p)
∂pl
∂pl
∂wk
−1{k∈Sr}
∂sk(p)
∂pj
+
X
l∈Sr
∂sl(p)
∂pj
∂pl
∂wk
+
X
l∈Sr
(pl−wl−cl)
X
s=1,..,J
∂2sl(p)
∂pj∂ps
∂ps
∂wk
= 0
(5)
Defining Spjp the (J × J)matrix of the second derivatives of the market shares with respect
to retail prices whose element (l, k) is ∂
2sk
∂pj∂pl , i.e.
Spjp ≡
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
∂2s1
∂p1∂pj . . .
∂2sJ
∂p1∂pj
... .
...
∂2s1
∂pJ∂pj . . .
∂2sJ
∂pJ∂pj
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
We can write equation (5) in matrix form5 :
Pw = IrSp(Ir − eIr) £SpIr + IrS0pIr + (Sp1p Irγ|...|SpJp Irγ)Ir¤−1 (6)
4Rows of this vector that correspond to private labels are zero.
5We use the notation (a|b) for horizontal concatenation for a and b.
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where γ = p−w−c. Equation (6) shows that one can express the manufacturer’s price cost
margins vector Γ = w − µ as depending on the function s(p) by replacing the expression
(6) for Pw in (4).
The expression (6) comes from the assumption that manufacturers act as Stackelberg
leaders in the vertical relationships with retailers. In the case where we would assume that
retailers and manufacturers set simultaneously their prices, we assume like Sudhir (2001)
that only the direct effect of wholesale price on retail price matter through. Thus, the
retailer’s cost of input is accounted for in the retailer’s choice of margin. In this case, the
matrix Pw has to be equal to the following diagonal matrix
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 0 .. .. 0
0
. . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . 1
. . .
...
... .. .. 0 0
0 .. .. 0 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Then, again one can compute the price-cost margins of the retailer and the manufacturer
under this assumption.
We can also consider the model where retailers and/or manufacturers collude perfectly
just by modifying the ownership matrices. In the case of perfect price collusion between re-
tailers, one can get the price cost margins of the retail industry by replacing the ownership
matrices Ir in (2) by the identity matrix (the situation being equivalent to a retailer in
monopoly situation). Similarly, one can get the price-cost margins vector of manufacturers
in the case of perfect collusion by replacing the ownership matrix If in (4) by a diagonal
matrix where diagonal elements are equal to one except for private labels goods.
3.2 Two-Part Tariffs
We now consider the case where manufacturers and retailers can sign two-part tariffs
contracts. We assume that manufacturers have all the bargaining power. To prove the
existence and characterize equilibria in this multiple common agency game is difficult. We
could assume the existence of symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibria but Rey and
Vergé (2004) prove that some equilibrium exists under some assumptions on the game
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played. Actually, assume that manufacturers and retailers play the following game. First,
manufacturers simultaneously propose two-part tariffs contracts to each retailer. These
contracts consist in the specification of franchise fees and wholesale prices but also on retail
prices in the case where manufacturers can use resale price maintenance. Thus we assume
that, for each product, manufacturers propose the contractual terms to retailers and then,
retailers simultaneously accept or reject the offers that are public information. If one offer
is rejected, then all contracts are refused6. If all offers have been accepted, the retailers
simultaneously set their retail prices, demands and contracts are satisfied. Assuming that
offers of manufacturers are public is a convenient modelling assumption that can however
be justified in France by the non-discrimination laws. Rey and Vergé (2004) show (in the
two manufacturers - two retailers case) that there exist some equilibria to this (double)
common agency game provided some conditions on elasticities of demand and on the
shape of profit functions are satisfied7. They show that it is always a dominant strategy for
manufacturers to set retail prices in their contracting relationship with retailers. Moreover,
with resale price maintenance, the manufacturer can always replicate the retail price that
would emerge and the profit it would earn without resale price maintenance. We also
consider the case where resale price maintenance would not be used by manufacturers
because in some contexts, like in France, resale price maintenance may be forbidden and
manufacturers thus prefer not to use it.
In the case of these two part tariffs contracts, the profit function of retailer r is :
Πr =
X
s∈Sr
[M(ps −ws − cs)ss(p)− Fs] (7)
where Fs is the franchise fee paid by the retailer for selling product s.
Manufacturers set their wholesale prices to wk and the franchise fees Fk and choose
6This assumption is strong but it happens that the characterization of equilibria in the opposite case
is very difficult (see Rey and Vergé, 2004). However, this assumption means that we should observe all
manufacturers trading with all retailers, which is the case for bottled water in France.
7These technical assumptions require that direct price effects dominate in demand elasticities such that
if all prices increase, demand decreases. The empirical estimation of demand will confirm that this is the
case for bottled water in France. Also it has to be that the monopoly profit function of the industry has
to be single peaked as well as manufacturers revenue functions of the wholesale price vector.
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the retail’s prices in order to maximize profits which is for firm f equal to
Πf =
X
k∈Ff
[M(wk − µk)sk(p) + Fk] (8)
subject to the retailers’ participation constraints Πr ≥ 0, for all r = 1, .., R.
Since the participation constraints are clearly binding (Rey and Vergé, 2004) and ma-
nufacturers choose the fixed fees Fk given the ones of the other manufacturers, one can
replace the expressions of the franchise fee Fk of the binding participation constraint (7)
into the manufacturer’s profit (8) and obtain the following profit for firm f (see details in
appendix 7.1) X
k∈Ff
(pk − µk − ck)sk(p) +
X
k 6∈Ff
(pk −wk − ck)sk(p)
Then, the maximization of this objective function depends on whether resale price main-
tenance is used or not by manufacturers.
Two part tariffs with resale price maintenance :
Since manufacturers can capture retail profits through the franchise fees and moreover set
retail prices, the wholesale prices have no direct effect on profit. Rey and Vergé (2004)
showed however that the wholesale prices influence the strategic behavior of competitors.
They show that there exists a continuum of equilibria, one for each wholesale price vector.
For each wholesale price vector w∗, there exists a unique symmetric subgame perfect
equilibrium in which retailers earn zero profit and manufacturers set retail prices to p∗(w∗),
where p∗(w∗) is a decreasing function of w∗ equal to the monopoly price when the wholesale
prices are equal to the marginal cost of production. For our purpose, we choose some
possible equilibria among this multiplicity of equilibria. For a given equilibrium p∗(w∗),
the program of manufacturer f is now
max
{pk}∈Ff
X
k∈Ff
(pk − µk − ck)sk(p) +
X
k 6∈Ff
(p∗k −w∗k − ck)sk(p)
Thus, we can write the first order conditions for this program as
X
k∈Ff
(pk − µk − ck)
∂sk(p)
∂pj
+ sj(p) +
X
k 6∈Ff
(p∗k −w∗k − ck)
∂sk(p)
∂pj
= 0 for all j ∈ Ff (9)
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Then, depending on the wholesale prices, several cases can be considered. We will consi-
der two cases of interest : first when wholesale prices are equal to the marginal cost of
production (w∗k = µk), second, when wholesale prices are such that the retailer’s price cost
margins are zero (p∗k(w∗k)−w∗k − ck = 0).
First, when w∗k = µk, the first order condition (9) writes
X
k∈Ff
(pk − µk − ck)
∂sk(p)
∂pj
+ sj(p) +
X
k 6∈Ff
(p∗k − µk − ck)
∂sk(p)
∂pj
= 0 for all j ∈ Ff
i.e. X
k
(pk − µk − ck)
∂sk(p)
∂pj
+ sj(p) = 0 for all j ∈ Ff
which gives in matrix notation :
IfSp(γ + Γ) + Ifs(p) = 0 (10)
In the case of private labels products, retailers choose retail prices and bear the mar-
ginal cost of production and distribution, maximizing :
max
{pj}j∈ eSr
X
k∈Sr
(pk − µk − ck)sk(p)
where eSr is the set of private label products of retailer r. Thus, for private label products,
additional equations are obtained from the first order conditions of the profit maximization
of retailers that both produce and retail these products. The first order conditions give
X
k∈Sr
(pk − µk − ck)
∂sk(p)
∂pj
+ sj(p) = 0 for all j ∈ eSr
which can be written
X
k∈Sr
(pk − µk − ck)
∂sk(p)
∂pj
+ sj(p) = 0 for all j ∈ eSr
In matrix notation, these first order conditions are : for r = 1, .., R
(eIrSpIr)(γ + Γ) + eIrs(p) = 0 (11)
where eIr is the ownership matrix of private label products by retailer r.
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We thus obtain a system of equations with (10) and (11) where γ + Γ is unknown.½ IfSp(γ + Γ) + Ifs(p) = 0 for f = 1, .., F
(eIrSpIr)(γ + Γ) + eIrs(p) = 0 for r = 1, .., R
After solving the system (see appendix 7.2), we obtain the expression for the total price-
cost margin of all products as a function of demand parameters and of the structure of
the industry :
γ + Γ = −
³X
r
IrS0p eIrSpIr +Xf S0pIfSp´−1 ³Xr IrS0p eIr +Xf S0pIf´ s(p) (12)
Remark that in the absence of private label products, this expression would simplify to
the case where the total profits of the integrated industry are maximized, that is
γ + Γ = −S−1p s(p) (13)
because then
P
f If = I.
This shows that two part tariffs contracts with RPM allow manufacturers to maximize
the full profits of the integrated industry if retailers have no private label products.
Second, when wholesale prices w∗k are such that p∗k(w∗k)−w∗k−ck = 0, then (9) becomes
X
k∈Ff
(pk − µk − ck)
∂sk(p)
∂pj
+ sj(p) = 0 for all j ∈ Ff
In matrix notations, we get for all f = 1, .., F
γf + Γf = (p− µ− c) = −(IfSpIf )−1Ifs(p)
In this case, the profit maximizing strategic pricing of private labels by retailers is
also taken into account by manufacturers when they choose fixed fees and retail prices of
their own products in the contract. This implies that the prices of private labels chosen
by retailers is such that they maximize their profit on these private labels and the total
price cost margin eγr + eΓr for these private labels will be such that
eγr + eΓr ≡ p− µ− c = −³eIrSp eIr´−1 eIrs(p) (14)
where eIr is the ownership matrices of private labels of retailer r.
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However, among the continuum of possible equilibria, Rey and Vergé (2004) showed
that the case where wholesale prices are equal to the marginal costs of production is the
equilibrium that would be selected if retailers can provide a retailing effort that increases
demand. Actually, in this case it is worth for the manufacturer to make the retailer residual
claimant of his retailing effort which leads to select this equilibrium wholesale price.
Two part tariffs without resale price maintenance :
Let’s consider now that resale price maintenance cannot be used by manufacturers. Since
they cannot choose retail prices, they only set wholesale prices in the following maximiza-
tion program
max
{wk}∈Ff
X
k∈Ff
(pk − µk − ck)sk(p) +
X
k 6∈Ff
(pk −wk − ck)sk(p)
Then the first order conditions are for all i ∈ FfX
k
∂pk
∂wi
sk(p)+
X
k∈Ff
⎡
⎣(pk − µk − ck)
X
j
∂sk
∂pj
∂pj
∂wi
⎤
⎦+
X
k 6∈Ff
⎡
⎣(pk −wk − ck)
X
j
∂sk
∂pj
∂pj
∂wi
⎤
⎦ = 0
which gives in matrix notation
IfPws(p) + IfPwSpIf × (p− µ− c) + IfPwSp(I − If )(p−w − c) = 0
This implies that the total price cost margin γ+Γ = p−µ−c is such that for all j = 1, .., J :
γ + Γ = (IfPwSpIf )−1 [−IfPws(p)− IfPwSp(I − If )(p−w − c)] (15)
that allows us to estimate the price-cost margins with demand parameters using (2) to
replace (p−w − c) and (6) for Pw. Remark again that the formula (2) provides directly
the total price-cost margin obtained by each retailer on its private label.
We are thus able to obtain the several expressions for price-cost margins at the manu-
facturing or retail levels under the different models considered and function of the demand
parameters.
4 Differentiated Products Demand
4.1 The Random Utility Demand Model
We now describe our model of differentiated product demand. We use a standard
random utility model. Actually, denoting Vijt the utility for consumer i of buying good j
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at period t, we assume that it can be represented by
Vijt = θjt + ujt + εijt
= δj + γt − αpjt + ujt + εijt for j = 1, ., J
where θjt is the mean utility of good j at period t, ujt a product-time specific unobserved
utility term and εijt a (mean zero) individual-product-period-specific utility term repre-
senting the deviation of individual’s preferences from the mean θjt.
Moreover, we assume that θjt is the sum of a mean utility δj of product j common to all
consumers, a mean utility γt common to all consumers and products at period t (due to
unobserved preference shocks to period t) and an income disutility αpjt where pjt is the
price of product j at period t.
Consumers may decide not to purchase any of the products. In this case they choose an
outside good for which the mean part of the indirect utility is normalized to 0, so that
Vi0t = εi0t. Remark that the specification used for θjt is such that one could also consider
that the mean utility of the outside good depends also on its time varying price p0t wi-
thout changing the identification of the other demand parameters. Actually, adding −αp0t
to the outside good mean utility is equivalent to adding αp0t to all other goods mean
utility, which would amount to replace γt by γt + αp0t.
In the bottled water market in France, it seems that customers make a clear diffe-
rence between two groups of bottled water : Mineral water and spring water, such that
it makes sense to allow customers to have correlated preferences over such groups 8. Our
demand model incorporates this observation. Indeed, we model the distribution of the
individual-specific utility term εijt according to the assumptions of a Generalized Extreme
Value (GEV) model (McFadden, 1978)9. We assume that the bottled water market can
be partitioned into G different groups (G = 2), each sub-group g containing Jg products
(
PG
g=1 Jg = J). With an abuse of notation, we will also denote Jg the set of products
belonging to the sub-group g. Since products belonging to the same subgroup share a
8Friberg and Ganslandt (2003) observe the same structure for bottled water demand in Sweden.
9Recent papers (Slade, 2004, and Benkers and Verboven, 2004 ) make the same assumption when
modeling the demand side of the markets they analyze.
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common set of unobserved features, consumers may have correlated preferences over these
features. A GEV model allows a general pattern of dependence among the unobserved
attributes and yields tractable closed form for the choice probabilities. Assuming that
consumers choose one unit of the good that maximizes utility, the distributional assump-
tions of a GEV model10 yield the following choice probabilities or market shares for each
product j, as a function of the price vector pt = (p1t, p2t, ..., pJt)
sjt(pt) = P
µ
Vijt = maxl=0,1,.,J (Vilt)
¶
= sjt/g(pt)× sgt(pt)
where sgt(pt) and sjt/g(pt) denote respectively the probability choice of group g and the
conditional probability of choosing good j conditionally on purchasing a good in group g.
The expressions of these probabilities are given by
sjt/g(pt) =
exp
θjt+ujt
1−σgP
j∈Jg exp
θjt+ujt
1−σg
sgt(pt) =
³P
j∈Jg exp
θjt+ujt
1−σg
´1−σg
PG
g=0
³P
j∈Jg exp
θjt+ujt
1−σg
´1−σg
The conditions on McFadden’s (1978) GEV model required for the model to be consistent
with random utility maximization are that each similarity index σg belongs to the unit
interval [0, 1]. When σg goes to 1, preferences for products of the same subgroup become
perfectly correlated meaning that these products are perceived as perfect substitutes.
When σg goes to 0, preferences for all products become uncorrelated, and the model
reduces to a simple multinomial logit model. At the aggregate demand level, the parameter
σg allows to assess to which extent competition is localized between products from the same
subgroup. This specification is more flexible than a simple multinomial logit specification
(since it includes it as a special case). Actually, in the special case where σg = 0 for
10The cumulative distribution function of the vector of the individual-specific utility terms εijt for
individual i at time t is given by F (ε) = exp(−G(e−εi1t , . . . , e−εiJt)) where the function G is defined as
follows
G(y) =
GX
g=1
[
X
j∈Jg
y
1
1−σg
j ]
1−σg .
The parameter σg associated to the subgroup g measures the degree of similarity of the unobserved attri-
butes in this subgroup.
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g = 1, .., G11, we obtain a simple multinomial logit model which amounts to assume that
εijt is i.i.d. with a type I extreme value distribution. Then we have
sjt(pt) =
exp [θjt + ujt]
1 +
P
j=1,.,J
exp [θjt + ujt]
The nested logit model can be interpreted as a special case of the random coefficients
logit models estimated by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), Nevo (2001), Petrin (2002)
and others. McFadden and Train (2000) show that any random utility model can be
arbitrarily approximated by a random coefficient logit model. The nested logit model
introduces restrictions on the underlying model but they are testable and this model has
the advantage to be much more tractable (Berry, 1994, and Berry and Pakes, 2001).
4.2 Identification and Estimation of the Econometric Model
Our method relies on two structural estimations, first, on the demand model and then
on the cost equation. In appendix 7.4, we argue that estimating the model parameters in a
single step thanks to the overall price equation would need to make too strong assumptions.
Following Berry (1994) and Verboven (1996), the random utility model introduced in
the previous section leads to the following equations on the aggregate market shares of
good j at time t
ln sjt − ln s0t = θjt + σg ln sjt|g + ujt
= δj + γt − αpjt + σg ln sjt|g + ujt (16)
where sjt|g is the relative market share of product j at period t in its group g and s0t
is the market share of the outside good at time t. In the particular case of the simple
multinomial logit model, this equation becomes
ln sjt − ln s0t = δj + γt − αpjt + ujt (17)
Remark that the full set of time fixed effects γt captures preferences for bottled water
relative to the outside good, and can thus be thought of as accounting for macro-economic
11The function G defined in footnote ? becomes G(y) =
PJ
j=1 yj .
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fluctuations (like the weather) that affect the decision to buy bottled water12 but also as
accounting for the outside good price variation across periods.
The error term ujt captures the remaining unobserved product valuations varying across
products and time, e.g. due to unobserved variations in advertising.
The usual problem of endogeneity of price pjt and relative market shares sjt|g has to be
handled correctly in order to identify and estimate the parameters of these models. Our
identification strategy then relies on the use of instrumental variables. Actually, thanks to
the collection of data on wages, oil, diesel, packaging material and plastic prices over the
period of interest, we construct instruments for prices pjt that are interactions between
product dummies and these prices (the vector of these instruments is denoted zjt). Using
characteristics of bottled water instead of product dummies crossed with input prices gives
similar empirical results. The identification then relies on the fact that these input prices
affect the product prices because they are correlated with input costs but are not correlated
with the idiosyncratic unobserved shocks to preferences ujt. For the simple logit model,
this set of instrumental variables is sufficient, but for the nested logit model, one has also
to take into account the endogeneity of the relative (within group) market shares. For these
relative market shares, our strategy relies on the fact that the contemporaneous correlation
between ln sjt|g and unobserved shocks ujt, which is the source of the endogeneity problem,
can be controlled for with some suitable projection of the relative market shares on the
hyperplane generated by some observed lagged variables. In order to take into account
this endogeneity problem, we denote Zjt = (1j=1, .., 1j=J , ςjt−1, zjt) the vector of variables
on which we project the right hand side endogenous variables (including dummy variables
for products), where ςjt−1 results form the projection of the lagged variable ln sjt−1|g on
the hyperplane orthogonal to the space spanned by a set of product fixed effects and the
variable ln sjt−2|g. ςjt−1 is thus the residual of the regression
ln sjt−1|g = πj + β ln sjt−2|g + ςjt−1
12Similarly, in all the regressions they perform, Friberg and Ganslandt (2003) include also a dummy for
the high demand season, i.e. summer.
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Then, the identification of the coefficients of (16) relies on the orthogonality condition
E (Zjtujt) = 0
The identification and estimation of these demand models then permits to evaluate own
and cross price elasticities in this differentiated product demand model.
4.3 Testing Between Alternative Models
We now present how to test between the alternative models once we have estimated
the demand model and obtained the different price-cost margins estimates according to
their expressions obtained in the previous section.
Denoting by h the different models considered, for product j at time t under model h,
we denote γhjt the retailer price cost margin and Γhjt the manufacturer price cost margin.
Using Chjt for the sum of the marginal cost of production and distribution (Chjt = µhjt+chjt)
we can estimate this marginal cost using prices and price cost margins with
Chjt = pjt − Γhjt − γhjt (18)
Let’s now assume that these marginal costs are affected by some exogenous shocks Wjt,
we use the following specification
Chjt = pjt − Γhjt − γhjt =
h
exp(ωhj +W 0jtλh)
i
ηhjt
where ωhj is an unknown product specific parameter, Wjt are observable random shock to
the marginal cost of product j at time t and ηhjt is an unobservable random shock to the
cost. Taking logarithms, we get
lnChjt = ωhj +W 0jtλh + ln ηhjt (19)
Assuming that corr(ln ηhjt,Wjt) = corr(ln ηhjt, ωhj ) = 0, one can identify and estimate
consistently ωhj , λg, and ηhjt.
Now, for any two models h and h0, one would like to test one model against the other,
that is test between
pjt = Γhjt + γhjt +
h
exp(ωhj +W 0jtλh)
i
ηhjt
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and
pjt = Γh
0
jt + γh
0
jt +
h
exp(ωh0j +W 0jtλh0)
i
ηh0jt
Using non linear least squares
min
λh,ωhj
Qhn(λh, ωhj ) = min
λh,ωhj
1
n
X
j,t
³
ln ηhjt
´2
= min
λh,ωhj
1
n
X
j,t
h
ln
³
pjt − Γhjt − γhjt
´
− ωhj −W 0jtλh
i2
Then, we use non nested tests (Vuong, 1989, and Rivers and Vuong, 2002) to infer which
model h is statistically the best. The tests we use consist in testing models one against
another. The test of Vuong (1989) applies in the context of maximum likelihood estimation
and thus would apply in our case if one assumes log-normality of ηhjt. Rivers and Vuong
(2002) generalized this kind of test to a broad class of estimation methods including
non linear least squares. Moreover, the Vuong (1989) or the Rivers and Vuong (2002)
approaches do not require that either competing model be correctly specified under the
tested null hypothesis. Indeed, other approaches such as Cox’s tests (see, among others,
Smith, 1992) require such an assumption, i.e. that one of the competing model accurately
describes the data. This assumption cannot be sustained when dealing with a real data
set like ours.
Taking any two competing models h and h0, the null hypothesis is that the two non
nested models are asymptotically equivalent when
H0 : limn→∞
n
Q¯hn(λh, ωhj )− Q¯h
0
n (λh0 , ωh
0
j )
o
= 0
where Q¯hn(λh, ωhj ) (resp. Q¯h
0
n (λh0 , ωh
0
j )) is the expectation of a lack-of-fit criterionQhn(λh, ωhj )
(i.e. the opposite of a goodness-of-fit criterion) evaluated for model h (resp. h0) at the
pseudo true values of the parameters of this model, denoted by λh, ωhj (resp. λh0 , ωh
0
j ). The
first alternative hypothesis is that h is asymptotically better than h0 when
H1 : limn→∞
n
Q¯hn(λh, ωhj )− Q¯h
0
n (λh0 , ωh
0
j )
o
< 0
Similarly, the second alternative hypothesis is that h0 is asymptotically better than h when
H2 : limn→∞
n
Q¯hn(λh, ωhj )− Q¯h
0
n (λh0 , ωh
0
j )
o
> 0
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The test statistic Tn captures the statistical variation that characterizes the sample values
of the lack-of-fit criterion and is then defined as a suitably normalized difference of the
sample lack-of-fit criteria, i.e.
Tn =
√
n
σˆhh0n
n
Qhn(bλh, bωhj )−Qh0n (bλh0 , bωh0j )o
where Qhn(bλh, bωhj ) (resp. Qh0n (bλh0 , bωh0j )) is the sample lack-of-fit criterion evaluated for mo-
del h (resp. h0) at the estimated values of the parameters of this model, denoted by bλh, bωhj
(resp. bλh0 , bωh0j ). σˆhh0n denotes the estimated value of the variance of the difference in lack-of-
fit. Since our models are strictly non nested, Rivers and Vuong showed that the asymptotic
distribution of the Tn statistic is standard normal. The selection procedure involves com-
paring the sample value of Tn with critical values of the standard normal distribution13.
In the empirical section, we will present evidence based on these different statistical tests.
5 Econometric Estimation and Test Results
5.1 Data and Variables
Our data were collected by the company SECODIP (Société d’Étude de la Consom-
mation, Distribution et Publicité) that conducts surveys about households’ consumption
in France. We have access to a representative survey for the years 1998, 1999, and 2000.
These data contain information on a panel of nearly 11000 French households and on
their purchases of mostly food products. This survey provides a description of the main
characteristics of the goods and records over the whole year the quantity bought, the
price, the date of purchase and the store where it is purchased. In particular, this survey
contains information on all bottled water purchased by these French households during
the three years of study. We consider purchases of the seven most important retailers
which represent 70.7% of the total purchases of the sample. We take into account the
most important brands, that is five national brands of mineral water, one national brand
of spring water, one retailer private label brand of mineral water and one retailer private
13 If α denotes the desired size of the test and tα/2 the value of the inverse standard normal distribution
evaluated at 1− α/2. If Tn < tα/2 we reject H0 in favor of H1 ; if Tn > tα/2 we reject H0 in favor of H2.
Otherwise, we do not reject H0.
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label spring water. The purchases of these eight brands represent 71.3% of the purchases
of the seven retailers. The national brands are produced by three different manufacturers :
Danone, Nestlé and Castel. This survey presents the advantage of allowing to compute
market shares that are representative of the national French market thanks to a weigh-
ting procedure of the available household panel. Then, the market shares are defined by
a weighted sum of the purchases of each brand during each month of the three years
considered divided by the total market size of the respective month. The market share
of the outside good is defined as the difference between the total size of the market and
the shares of the inside goods. We consider all other non-alcoholic refreshing drinks as the
outside good. Therefore, the market size consists in all non-alcoholic refreshing drinks such
as bottled water (including sparkling and flavored water), tea drinks, colas, tonics, fruit
drinks, sodas lime. Our data thus allow to compute this market size across all months of
the study. It is clearly varying across periods and shows that the market for non-alcoholic
drinks is affected by seasons or for example the weather.
We consider eight brands sold in seven distributors, which gives more than 50 differen-
tiated products in this national market. The number of products in our study thus varies
between 51 and 54 during the 3 years considered. Considering the monthly market shares
of all of these differentiated products, we get a total of 2041 observations in our sample.
For each of these products, we compute an average price for each month. These prices
are in euros per liter (even if until 2000, the money used was the French Franc). Table 1
presents some first descriptive statistics on some of the main variables used.
Variable Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max
Per Product Market share (all inside goods) 0.005 0.003 0.006 4.10−6 0.048
Per Product Market share : Mineral Water 0.004 0.003 0.003 10−6 0.048
Per Product Market share : Spring Water 0.010 0.007 0.010 10−5 0.024
Price in C=/liter 0.298 0.323 0.099 0.096 0.823
Price in C=/liter : Mineral Water 0.346 0.343 0.060 0.128 0.823
Price in C=/liter : Spring Water 0.169 0.157 0.059 0.096 0.276
Mineral water dummy (0/1) 0.73 1 0.44 0 1
Market Share of the Outside Good 0.71 0.71 0.04 0.59 0.78
Table 1 : Summary Statistics
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We also use data from the French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies
(INSEE) on the plastic price, on a wage salary index for France, on oil and diesel prices
and on an index for packaging material cost. Over the time period considered (1998-2000),
the wage salary index always raised while the plastic price index first declined during 1998
and the beginning of 1999 before raising again and reaching the 1998 level at the end
of 2000. Concerning the diesel price index, it shows quite an important volatility with a
first general decline during 1998 before a sharp increase until a new decline at the end
of 2000. Also, the packaging material cost index shows important variations with a sharp
growth in 1998, a decline at the beginning of 1999 and again an important growth until the
end of 2000. Interactions of these prices with the dummies for the type of water (spring
versus mineral) will serve as instrumental variables as they are supposed to affect the
marginal cost of production and distribution of bottled water. Actually, it is likely that
labor cost is not the same for the production of mineral or spring water but it is also
known in this industry that the plastic quality used for mineral or spring water is usually
not the same which is also likely to affect their bottling and packaging costs. Also, the
relatively important variations of all these price indices during the period of study suggests
a potentially good identification of our cost equations.
5.2 Demand Results
We estimate the demand model (16) which is the following
ln sjt − ln s0t = δj + γt − αpjt + σg ln sjt|g + ujt
as well as the simple logit demand model (17) using two stage least squares in order
to instrument the endogenous variables pjt and ln sjt|g. Results are in Table 2. F tests
of the first stage regressions show that our instrumental variables are well correlated
with the endogenous variables. Moreover, the Sargan test of overidentification validates
the exclusion of excluded instruments from the main equation. The price coefficient has
the expected sign in both specifications and in the case of the nested logit model, the
coefficients σg actually belongs to the [0, 1] interval as required by the theory. Moreover,
24
since one can reject that parameters σg are zero, it is clear that the nested logit specification
is preferred to the simple logit one for this market of bottled water.
Variable Multinomial Logit Nested Logit
Price (α) (Std. error) 5.47 (0.44) 4.11 (0.077)
Mineral water σg (Std. error) 0.68 (0.025)
Spring water σg (Std. error) 0.59 (0.018)
Coefficients δj , γt not shown
F test that all δj = 0 (p value) 219.74 (0.000) 55.84 (0.000)
Wald test that all γt = 0 (p value) 89.89 (0.0000) 64.50 (0.0034)
Sargan Test of overidentification (p value) 6.30 (0.18) 8.38 (0.08)
Table 2 : Estimation Results of Demand Models
In appendix 7.5, we present the first stage regression results for the estimation of this
demand model using two stage least squares.
Given the demand estimates, it is interesting to note that we find estimates of unobser-
ved product specific mean utilities δj. Using these parameters estimates, one can look at
their correlation with observed product characteristics using ordinary least squares. This
is done in Table 3 below.
Fixed Effects δj Multinomial Logit Nested Logit
Mineral Water (0/1) (Std. error) -1.98 (0.13) -0.89 (0.08)
Minerality (Std. error) 0.83 (0.05) 0.63 (0.03)
Manufacturer 1 (Std. error) 5.76 (0.12) 3.89 (0.08)
Manufacturer 2 (Std. error) 5.23 (0.12) 3.57 (0.08)
Manufacturer 3 (Std. error) -3.83 (0.09) -3.00 (0.06)
Constant (Std. error) -2.56 (0.06) -2.08 (0.04)
F test (p value) 3300.50 (0.00) 3926.94 (0.00)
Table 3 : Regression of fixed effects on the product characteristics
Table 3 shows that the product specific constant mean utility δj is increasing with
the minerality of water and that the identity of the manufacturer of the bottled water
affects this mean utility. This is probably due to image, reputation and advertising of the
manufacturing brands. Remark that if one does not control for the manufacturer identity
this mean utility is larger for mineral water rather than spring water but it is not the case
anymore when one introduces these manufacturer dummy variables.
Finally, once we obtained our structural demand estimates, we can compute price elasti-
cities of demand for our differentiated products14. Table 4 presents the different average
14Formulas of the different elasticities are given in appendix 7.8.
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elasticities obtained for the simple multinomial logit or the nested logit demand model.
All of them have the expected sign and the magnitude of own-price elasticities are much
larger than that of cross-price elasticities. It is interesting to see that in the unrestricted
specification (nested logit), the average own price elasticities are larger than in the restric-
ted (multinomial logit) model. Also average own price elasticities for mineral water and
spring water are almost proportional to average prices of these segments (nearly twice for
mineral water than for spring water) both in the case of the multinomial logit model and
the more flexible nested logit model. As expected, the cross-price elasticities are larger
within each segment of product than across segments.
Elasticities (ηjk) Multinomial Logit Nested Logit
All bottle water Mean (Std. Error) Mean (Std. Error)
Own-price elasticity -10.80 (3.52) -19.95 (6.60)
Cross-price elasticity within group 0.05 (0.04) 0.44 (0.34)
Cross-price elasticity across group 0.04 (0.03)
Mineral water
Own-price elasticity -12.53 (2.03) -23.16 (3.85)
Cross-price elasticity within group 0.05 (0.04) 0.41 (0.28)
Cross-price elasticity across group 0.04 (0.03)
Spring water
Own-price elasticity -6.07 (2.14) -11.14 (4.06)
Cross-price elasticity within group 0.06 (0.05) 0.51 (0.44)
Cross-price elasticity across group 0.04 (0.04)
Table 4 : Summary of Elasticities Estimates
These elasticities are quite large but it seems consistent with the fact that our model
considers a very precise degree of differentiation. Actually, even for non sparkling spring
and natural water, we end up with 56 products as we consider that the brand and the
supermarket chain distributor are differentiation characteristics of a bottle of water. It is
not surprising to find that these products are importantly substitutable.
However, if one looks at some group level elasticities, one finds much lower absolute
values for these elasticities. The Table 5 shows these elasticities for the groups of mineral
water or spring water or for different brands or firms (a firm produces several brands on
this market). It appears that the total price elasticity of the group of mineral water goes
down to -7.40 instead of an average of -23.16 at the product level and that for spring water
it goes down from -11.14 to -3.41.
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Table 5 : Own-Price Elasticities (nested logit case)
Set of products15 Average elasticity Total elasticity
Group g 1#{k∈g}
P
k∈g ηgk
P
k∈g ηgk
Mineral Water -0.21 -7.40
Spring Water -0.27 -3.41
Mineral Water NB 1 -0.26 -1.74
Mineral Water NB 2 -0.15 -1.02
Mineral Water NB 3 -0.20 -1.27
Mineral Water NB 4 -0.27 -1.80
Mineral Water NB 5 -0.39 -2.61
Spring Water NB -0.22 -1.40
Mineral Water PL 0.07 0.16
Spring Water PL -0.28 -1.85
Firm f 1#{k∈f}
P
k∈f ηfk
P
k∈f ηfk
Danone -0.99 -13.11
Nestlé -1.64 -32.37
Castel -0.22 -1.40
5.3 Price-Cost Margins and Non Nested Tests
Once one has estimated the demand parameters, we can use the formulas obtained in
section 3 to compute the price cost margins at the retailer and manufacturer levels, or
the total price cost margins, for all products, under the various scenarios considered. We
presented several models that seem worth of consideration with some variants on manu-
facturers or retailers behavior. Among the different models with double marginalization or
two part tariffs, we consider the models described in the following table. Each scenario can
be described according to the assumptions made on the manufacturers behavior (collusive
or Nash), the retailers behavior (collusive or Nash) and the vertical interaction which can
be Stackelberg or Nash under double marginalization or under two part tariffs contracts
(with RPM or not) :
15NB means National Brand and PL means Private Label.
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Models Retailers Manufacturers Vertical
Behavior Behavior Interaction
Double marginalization
Model 1 Collusion Nash Nash
Model 2 Collusion Nash Stackelberg
Model 3 Collusion Collusion Nash
Model 4 Collusion Collusion Stackelberg
Model 5 Nash Nash Nash
Model 6 Nash Nash Stackelberg
Model 7 Nash Collusion Nash
Model 8 Nash Collusion Stackelberg
Two Part Tariffs
Model 9 Nash Nash RPM16(w = µ)
Model 10 Nash Nash RPM (p = w+ c)
Model 11 Collusion Collusion RPM (p = w+ c)
Model 12 Nash Nash no RPM
Note that in the case of private labels products, we assume that the retailer is also the
producer which amounts in our models to assume that the behavior for pricing private
labels is equivalent to the one of a manufacturer perfectly colluding with the retailer for
this good. Of course, only one price cost margin is then computed for these private label
goods because it has then no meaning to compute wholesale price and retail price margins
separately.
Tables 6 and 7 then present the averages17 of product level price cost margins estimates
under the different models with either the logit demand (Table 6) or the more general nes-
ted logit demand (Table 7). It is worth noting that price cost margins are generally lower
for mineral water than for spring water. As done by Nevo (2001), one could then compare
price cost margins with accounting data to evaluate their empirical validity and also even-
tually test which model provides the most realistic result. However, the lack of data both
on retailers or manufacturers margins prevents such analysis. Moreover accounting data
only provide an upper bound for price-cost margins.
16RPM means resale price maintenance. Vertical contracts are such that the producer is always a Sta-
ckelberg leader.
17Note that the average price-cost margin at the retailer level plus the average price-cost margin at the
manufacturer level do not sum to the total price cost margin because of the private labels products for
which no price cost margin at the manufacturer level is computed, the retailer price cost margin being
then equal to the total price cost margin.
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Price-Cost Margins (% of retail price p) Mineral Water Spring Water
Mean Std. Mean Std.
Double Marginalization
Model 1 Retailers 11.63 2.29 26.47 9.53
Manufacturers 8.53 1.02 27.67 2.35
Total 19.60 2.57 39.94 23.34
Model 2 Retailers 11.63 2.29 26.47 9.53
Manufacturers 9.09 1.07 30.00 2.97
Total 20.13 2.64 41.08 24.57
Model 3 Retailers 11.63 2.29 26.47 9.53
Manufacturers 10.34 1.31 32.95 3.03
Total 21.29 3.00 42.51 26.02
Model 4 Retailers 11.63 2.29 26.47 9.53
Manufacturers 13.55 1.98 43.29 5.39
Total 24.30 3.87 47.55 31.41
Model 5 Retailers 8.54 1.63 19.44 6.87
Manufacturers 8.53 1.02 27.67 2.35
Total 16.52 2.31 32.92 20.73
Model 6 Retailers 8.54 1.63 19.44 6.87
Manufacturers 8.62 1.03 28.78 2.83
Total 16.61 2.33 33.46 21.31
Model 7 Retailers 8.54 1.63 19.44 6.87
Manufacturers 10.34 1.31 32.95 3.03
Total 18.21 2.75 35.49 23.41
Model 8 Retailers 8.54 1.63 19.44 6.87
Manufacturers 11.01 1.42 35.40 3.99
Total 18.85 2.90 36.68 24.69
Two part Tariffs with RPM
Model 9 Nash and w = µ 11.63 2.29 26.47 9.53
Model 10 Nash and p = w+ c 8.54 1.01 27.59 2.32
Model 11 Collusion and p = w + c 10.31 1.30 32.78 3.04
Two-part Tariffs without RPM
Model 12 Retailers 8.54 1.63 19.44 6.87
Manufacturers 2.09 0.39 7.01 1.62
Total 10.33 1.28 33.12 3.10
Table 6 : Price-Cost Margins by groups for the Multinomial Logit Model
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Price-Cost Margins (% of retail price p) Mineral Water Spring Water
Mean Std. Mean Std.
Double Marginalization
Model 1 Retailers 15.09 2.96 34.42 12.41
Manufacturers 6.71 0.80 23.85 2.32
Total 21.36 2.74 46.01 24.33
Model 2 Retailers 15.09 2.96 34.42 12.41
Manufacturers 8.26 1.14 26.82 4.26
Total 22.81 2.80 47.45 25.98
Model 3 Retailers 15.09 2.96 34.42 12.41
Manufacturers 12.39 1.56 28.06 2.91
Total 26.66 3.66 48.05 26.47
Model 4 Retailers 15.09 2.96 34.42 12.41
Manufacturers 34.33 5.63 46.89 8.06
Total 47.15 9.71 57.20 36.37
Model 5 Retailers 5.51 2.02 12.19 4.34
Manufacturers 6.71 0.80 23.85 2.32
Total 11.78 2.05 23.78 16.31
Model 6 Retailers 5.51 2.02 12.19 4.34
Manufacturers 7.07 2.52 28.92 12.21
Total 12.09 3.09 26.25 20.50
Model 7 Retailers 5.51 2.02 12.19 4.34
Manufacturers 12.39 1.56 28.06 2.91
Total 17.08 3.18 25.83 18.44
Model 8 Retailers 5.51 2.02 12.19 4.34
Manufacturers 14.05 2.72 35.18 15.38
Total 19.13 4.29 29.29 24.27
Two part Tariffs with RPM
Model 9 Nash and w = µ 15.09 2.96 34.41 12.41
Model 10 Nash and p = w+ c 6.94 1.82 15.77 8.06
Model 11 Collusion and p = w + c 12.24 2.14 17.81 10.20
Two-part Tariffs without RPM
Model 12 Retailers 5.51 2.02 12.19 4.34
Manufacturers 3.84 1.66 14.12 3.46
Total 9.06 2.36 18.82 11.60
Table 7 : Price-Cost Margins (averages by groups) for the Nested Logit Model
After estimating the different price cost margins for the models considered, one can
recover the marginal cost Chjt using equation (18) and then estimate the cost equation
(19). The empirical results of the estimation of these cost equations are in appendix 7.6.
They are useful mostly in order to test which model fits best the data. We thus performed
the non nested tests presented in 4.3. Tables 8 and 9 present the Rivers and Vuong tests
for the logit or nested logit demand models. In both cases, the statistics of test18 show
18Recall that for a 5% size of the test, we reject H0 in favor of H2 if Tn is lower than the critical value
-1.64 and that we reject H0 in favor of H1 if Tn is higher than the critical value 1.64.
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that the best model appears to be the model 10, that is the case where manufacturers use
two part tariffs contracts with resale price maintenance. The Vuong (1989) tests based on
the maximum likelihood estimation of the cost equations under normality draw the same
inference about the best model (see Tables of results of these tests in appendix 7.7).
Rivers and Vuong Test Statistic Tn=
√nbσn
³
Q2n(Θˆ
2
n)−Q
1
n(Θˆ
1
n)
´
→ N(0, 1)
Â H2
H1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 2.51 2.60 4.59 -2.64 -2.63 -2.40 -1.94 -2.71 -2.86 -2.78 -2.78
2 2.07 4.19 -3.20 -3.20 -3.05 -2.72 -3.26 -3.35 -3.30 -3.30
3 4.29 -3.35 -3.35 -3.18 -3.11 -3.42 -3.53 -3.47 -3.47
4 -5.16 -5.16 -5.04 -4.98 -5.20 -5.28 -5.24 -5.24
5 0.57 9.27 3.36 -1.94 -8.27 -6.45 -6.96
6 6.11 3.52 -2.58 -9.64 -7.30 -6.48
7 2.14 -8.12 -9.59 -9.23 -9.31
8 -3.65 -4.36 -4.06 -3.99
9 -9.45 -7.42 -6.79
10 10.61 8.82
11 0.74
Table 8 : Results of the Rivers and Vuong Test for the Multinomial Logit Model
Rivers and Vuong Test Statistic : Tn=
√
nbσn
³
Q2n(Θˆ
2
n)−Q
1
n(Θˆ
1
n)
´
→ N(0, 1)
Â H2
H1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 5.90 6.22 5.99 -9.85 -9.51 -9.78 -9.14 -9.98 -10.10 -10.02 -9.71
2 5.59 5.77 -9.82 -9.50 -9.75 -9.23 -9.83 -10.09 -10.01 -9.74
3 5.32 -8.82 -8.58 -8.75 -8.36 -8.55 -9.09 -9.02 -8.81
4 -7.62 -7.49 -7.55 -7.36 -7.23 -7.80 -7.74 -7.64
5 5.73 6.91 6.62 8.85 -10.65 -9.01 -4.70
6 -0.22 4.36 7.63 -9.70 -8.79 -6.61
7 5.10 8.62 -9.48 -9.76 -6.51
8 5.71 -8.65 -8.39 -6.84
9 -9.60 -9.53 -8.62
10 6.83 11.16
11 3.43
Table 9 : Results of the Rivers and Vuong Test for the Nested Logit Model
Finally, the non rejected model tells that manufacturers use two part tariffs with
retailers and moreover (as predicted by the theory) that they use resale price maintenance
in their contracting relationships although it is in principle not legal in France.
For this model, the estimated total price cost margins (price minus marginal cost of
production and distribution), are relatively low with an average of 6.94% for the mineral
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water and 15.77% for spring water. These figures are lower than the rough accounting
estimates that one can get from aggregate data (see section 2). As Nevo (2001) remarks
the accounting margins only provide an upper bound of the true values. Moreover, the
accounting estimates do not take into account the marginal cost of distribution while
our structural estimates do. Thus, these empirical results seem then quite realistic and
consistent with the bounds provided by accounting data. In absolute values, the price-cost
margins are on average close for mineral water and for spring water because mineral water
is on average more expensive. Actually, the absolute margins are on average of 0.022 C= for
mineral water and 0.017 C= for spring water. For our best model, we can look at the average
price-cost margins for national brands products versus private labels products. In the case
of mineral water, the average price-cost margins for national brands and private labels
are not statistically different and about the same with an average of 4.72% for national
brands and of 10.18% for private labels. However, in the case of natural spring water, it
appears that price-cost margins for national brands are larger than for private labels with
an average of 23.86% instead of 8.13%.
5.4 Simulating Counterfactual Policy Experiments
The estimation of the structural demand and cost parameters now allows to simulate
some counterfactual policy experiments. Let’s present first the method used to simulate
these counterfactual policy experiments and then the particular policies and simulation
results considered.
We denote by If , Ir, the true ownership matrices for manufacturers and retailers and h
the preferred pricing equilibrium according to our data (two part tariffs model with RPM).
The previous estimation and inference allow to estimate a vector of marginal costs (of
production and distribution) for the preferred model. We denote Ct = (C1t, .., Cjt, .., CJt)
the vector of these marginal costs for all products present at time t, where Cjt is obtained
by
Cjt = pjt − Γjt − γjt
Then, given these marginal costs and the other estimated structural parameters, one
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can simulate some policy experiment denoted (I∗f , I∗r ) where I∗f stands for some ownership
matrices of manufacturers, and I∗r stands for some ownership matrices of retailers. Actually,
using equilibrium conditions, it is possible to simulate the policy experiment that would
consist in modifying some elements of the ownership matrices.
Thus let’s consider the policy experiment (I∗f , I∗r ) where product ownership have been
changed to I∗f , I∗r . We simply have to solve for equilibrium prices p∗t as solutions of
p∗t + (I∗fSp (p∗t ))−1I∗fs(p∗t ) = Ct (20)
Market shares s(p∗t ) and their derivatives Sp (p∗t ) depend of course on the equilibrium
prices p∗t and the demand model specification, which is given by
sjt(p∗t ) = sjt/g(p∗t )× sgt(p∗t ) with
sjt/g(p∗t ) =
exp
θjt(p∗t )+ujt
1−σgP
j∈Jg exp
θjt(p∗t )+ujt
1−σg
and sgt(p∗t ) =
³P
j∈Jg exp
θjt(p∗t )+ujt
1−σg
´1−σg
PG
g=0
³P
j∈Jg exp
θjt(p∗t )+ujt
1−σg
´1−σg
The estimation of the parameters of our demand model allows to compute θjt(p∗jt) + ujt.
Using the fact that θjt(pjt) is additive linear in price, we have
θjt(p∗jt) + ujt = θjt(pjt) + ujt + α
¡
pjt − p∗jt
¢
Then, we can use the fact that θjt(pjt) + ujt is identified from the data thanks to the
equality θjt(pjt) + ujt = ln sjt − ln s0t − σg ln sjt|g.
Thus solving the non linear equation (20) whose unknowns are the prices p∗jt, one obtain
simulated equilibrium prices under such policy. Markets shares are obtained using the
simulated prices.
For a policy experiment (I∗f , I∗r ), we thus look for the solution vector p∗t of
min
{p∗jt}j=1,..,J
°°p∗t + (I∗fSp (p∗t ))−1I∗fs(p∗t )−Ct°°
where k.k is a norm of RJ . In practice we will take the euclidean norm in RJ .
Then, one can compute the consumer surplus using the usual formula for nested logit
CSt(pt) = E
∙
max
j
Vijt (pt)
¸
= ln
⎛
⎝
GX
g=1
exp
⎡
⎣(1− σg) ln
⎛
⎝X
j∈Jg
exp
θjt + ujt
1− σg
⎞
⎠
⎤
⎦
⎞
⎠
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and evaluate the change in consumer surplus of any counterfactual policy by CSt(pt) −
CSt(p∗t ) for the new equilibrium.
In practice, we considered several counterfactual policy experiments consisting in chan-
ging the ownership of products. In particular, we take advantage of the introduction of
the strategic effect of retailers’ behavior in the vertical relationship with manufacturers to
simulate policies where ownership of private labels changes from retailers to some manu-
facturer.
Table 10 shows the results of the simulations of policies consisting in allocating the
brand ownership of all private labels to one of the three manufacturers while the pricing
policy of manufacturers continues using two part tariffs contracts with resale price main-
tenance. Giving all private labels to Danone or Nestlé results in an increase of the average
price of bottles of water of a little more than 1% and a decrease of market shares between 7
and 12% on average. The increase in average prices is also on average larger for the private
labels that passed to the manufacturer. Giving the private labels to Castel would result
in a larger increase of the average price of these private labels and an increase of prices of
products of Castel that would use its increased market power to increase prices of all its
products that are more substitute with private labels than those of other national brands.
Moreover, all these policies would decrease the consumer surplus which means that on this
very concentrated market, private labels are actually beneficial to consumers.
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Change Change in
Policy of price p∗jt market share s∗jt
Private Labels to Danone
Average19 +1.34 % -12.28 %
Average for Danone PL +2.26 % -18.88 %
Average for Danone NB +0.92 % -15.38 %
Average for Nestlé +0.28 % -7.96 %
Average for Castel +4.23 % -8.58 %
Average for outside good +4.98 %
CSt(p∗t )−CSt(pt)
CSt(pt) in % -39.85 %
Private Labels to Nestlé
Average +1.17 % -7.32 %
Average for Danone +1.11 % -13.97 %
Average for Nestlé PL +3.17 % -13.26 %
Average for Nestlé NB +0.37 % -2.47 %
Average for Castel +1.12 % +0.49 %
Average for outside good +2.86 %
CSt(p∗t )−CSt(pt)
CSt(pt) in % -25.66 %
Private Labels to Castel
Average +2.42 % -21.18 %
Average for Danone +1.21 % -28.96 %
Average for Nestlé +1.23 % -24.47 %
Average for Castel PL +1.24 % +0.58 %
Average for Castel NB +9.62 % -2.54 %
Average for outside good +8.69 %
CSt(pt)−CSt(p∗t )
CSt(pt) in % -34.17 %
Table 10 : Policy experiments on Private Labels Ownership
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented the first empirical estimation of a structural model taking
into account explicitly two part tariffs contracts between manufacturers and retailers. We
show how to estimate different structural models embedding the strategic relationships
between manufacturers and retailers in the supermarket industry. In particular, we pre-
sented how one can test whether manufacturers use two part tariffs contracts with retailers.
We consider several alternative models of competition between manufacturers and retai-
lers on a differentiated product market and test between these alternatives. We consider
in particular two types of non linear pricing relationships with two part tariffs contracts,
where in one resale price maintenance is used and in the other no resale price maintenance
19The average is over the periods (39) and products (54).
35
is allowed. The method is based on estimates of demand parameters that allow to reco-
ver price-cost margins at the manufacturer and retailer levels. We then test between the
different models using exogenous variables that are supposed to shift the marginal cost of
production and distribution. We apply this methodology to study the market for retailing
bottled water in France. Our empirical evidence allows to conclude that manufacturers
and retailers use non linear pricing contracts and in particular two part tariffs contracts
with resale price maintenance. Although resale price maintenance is illegal in France, our
empirical result just shows that contractual relationships imply pricing strategies that al-
low to replicate this equilibrium. But it is worth noting that this pricing equilibrium could
be reached through the use of two part tariffs contracts with resale price maintenance, but
it is possible that it is in reality implemented through more complex non linear contracts
that would not involve resale price maintenance. Finally, we were able to simulate some
counterfactual policy experiments related to the non linear pricing mechanisms used by
manufacturers and retailers.
This work calls for further developments and studies about competition under non
linear pricing in the supermarket industry. In particular, we need further studies where
assumptions of non constant marginal cost of production and distribution would be allowed
are needed. Also, it is clear that more empirical work on other markets will be useful for
a better understanding of vertical relationships in the retailing industry. Finally taking
into account the endogenous market structure is also an objective that theoretical and
empirical research will have to tackle.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Detailed proof of the manufacturers profit expression under two
part tariffs
We use the theoretical results due to Rey and Vergé (2004) applied to our context
with F firms and R retailers. The participation constraint being binding, we have for all
r
P
s∈Sr
[M(ps −ws − cs)ss(p)− Fs] = 0 which implies thatX
s∈Sr
Fs =
X
s∈Sr
M(ps −ws − cs)ss(p)
and thusX
j∈Ff
Fj +
X
j 6∈Ff
Fj =
X
j=1,.,J
Fj =
X
r=1,.,R
X
s∈Sr
Fs
=
X
r=1,.,R
X
s∈Sr
M(ps −ws − cs)ss(p) =
X
j=1,.,J
M(pj −wj − cj)sj(p)
so that X
j∈Ff
Fj =
X
j=1,..,J
M(pj −wj − cj)sj(p)−
X
j 6∈Ff
Fj
Then, the firm f profits are
Πf =
X
k∈Ff
M(wk − µk)sk(p) +
X
k∈Ff
Fk
=
X
k∈Ff
M(wk − µk)sk(p) +
X
j=1,..,J
M(pj −wj − cj)sj(p)−
X
j 6∈Ff
Fj
Since, producers fix the fixed fees given the ones of other producers, we have that under
resale price maintenance :
max
{Fi,pi}i∈Ff
Πf ⇔ max
{pi}i∈Ff
X
k∈Ff
(wk − µk)sk(p) +
X
j=1,..,J
(pj −wj − cj)sj(p)
⇔ max
{pi}i∈Ff
X
k∈Ff
(pk − µk)sk(p) +
X
k 6∈Ff
(pk −wk − ck)sk(p)
and with no resale price maintenance
max
{Fi,wi}i∈Ff
Πf ⇔ max
{wi}i∈Ff
X
k∈Ff
(wk − µk)sk(p) +
X
j=1,..,J
(pj −wj − cj)sj(p)
⇔ max
{wi}i∈Ff
X
k∈Ff
(pk − µk)sk(p) +
X
k 6∈Ff
(pk −wk − ck)sk(p)
Then the first order conditions of the different two part tariffs models can be derived very
simply.
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7.2 Detailed resolution of system of equations
Generically we have systems of equations to be solved of the form½
Af (γ + Γ) +Bf = 0
for f = 1, ..,G
where Af and Bf are some given matrices.
Solving this system amounts to solve the following minimization problem
min
γ+Γ
GX
f=1
[Af (γ + Γ) +Bf ]0 [Af (γ + Γ) +Bf ]
leads to the first order conditions
⎛
⎝
GX
f=1
A0fAf
⎞
⎠ (γ + Γ)−
GX
f=1
A0fBf = 0
that allow to find the following expression for its solution
(γ + Γ) =
⎛
⎝
GX
f=1
A0fAf
⎞
⎠
−1 GX
f=1
A0fBf
7.3 Structural demand equation and instruments
The structural demand model is such that
ln sjt − ln s0t = θjt + σg ln sjt|g + ujt
ln sjt − ln s0t = δj + γt − αpjt + σg ln sjt|g + ujt
where sjt|g is endogenous because E
¡
sjt|g.ujt
¢ 6= 0. Taking the log of the expression of the
relative market share of good j in group g, we have
ln sjt−1/g =
θjt−1 + ujt−1
1− σg
− ln
⎡
⎣X
j∈Jg
exp
θjt−1 + ujt−1
1− σg
⎤
⎦
Then, with a first order approximation gives
ln
⎡
⎣X
j∈Jg
exp
θjt−1 + ujt−1
1− σg
⎤
⎦ ' θj∗t−1 + uj∗t−1
1− σg
where j∗ is such that θj∗t−1 + uj∗t−1 > θjt−1 + ujt−1 ∀j 6= j∗. Then,
ln sjt−1/g '
θjt−1 + ujt−1
1− σg
− θj
∗t−1 + uj∗t−1
1− σg
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Then,
ςjt−1 = ln sjt−1/g −E
³
ln sjt−1/g| {θjt−1}j=1,..,J
´
' ujt−1
1− σg
+E
µ
θj∗t−1 + uj∗t−1
1− σg
| {θjt−1}j=1,..,J
¶
− θj
∗t−1 + uj∗t−1
1− σg
' ujt−1 − uj∗t−1
1− σg
Thus, assuming that ∀j 6= j0,∀t, E ¡uj0t.ujt−1¢ = 0 it implies that E ¡uj0t.ςjt−1¢ ' 0 which
justifies the use of ςjt−1 in the list of instruments Zt.
7.4 Identification method of demand and supply parameters
Under a given supply model, for a given product j, at period t, the total price cost
margins γjt + Γjt can be expressed as a parametric function of prices and unobserved
demand shocks ut = (u1t, .., ujt, .., uJt) : in the case of two part tariffs with resale price
maintenance,
γjt + Γjt = −
£
(IfSptIf )−1Ifs(pt, ut)
¤
j
where [.]j denotes the jth row of vector [.].
As marginal cost can be expressed as a function of observed cost shifterWjt, unobserved
product specific effects ωj, and unobserved shocks ηjt, we have
Cjt = exp(ωj +W 0jtλ)ηjt
The identification of the price-cost margins relies on the assumption that instruments Zjt
satisfy
E (Zjtujt) = 0
and the identification of the cost function relies on the assumption that
E(ln ηjtWjt) = E(ln ηjtωj) = 0
However, adding cost and marginal cost equations, one can also get a price equation
pjt +
£
(IfSptIf )−1Ifs(pt, ut)
¤
j = exp(ωj +W
0
jtλ)ηjt
Identifying the parameters of this price equation would then require the specification of the
joint law of unobservable shocks
¡
ηjt, ut
¢
. Thus, our two-step method has the advantage
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of providing identification of demand and cost parameters under weaker assumptions. In
particular we do not have to make any assumptions on the correlation between unobserved
shocks
¡
ηjt, ut
¢
.
7.5 Details on regressions for demand estimates
Our first stage regressions for the two stage least squares estimation are
ln sjt|g = Zjtβg + ξ
g
jt for g = 1, 2
pjt = Zjtβp + ξpjt
that are presented in Table 11.
First stage regressions Dependent Variable
Explanatory variables
Zjt Price pjt ln sjt|g (Spring) ln sjt|g (Mineral)
zjt
(wage) w1t ×1(j∈Mineral) 0.00757 (0.0243) -0.0186 (0.0252) -1.36e-14 (0.039)
(wage) w1t × 1(j∈Spring) 0.0533 (0.0285) 0.0186 (0.0295) 0.0265 (0.0461)
(plastic) w2t ×1(j∈Mineral) 0.00453 (0.01) -0.0178 (0.0104) -6.51e-15 (0.016)
(plastic) w2t ×1(j∈Spring) 0.00129 (0.0117) 0.0178 (0.0121) 0.0165 (0.0189)
(diesel) w3t ×1(j∈Mineral) -0.00317 (0.0048) 0.00907 (0.0049) 8.66e-15 (0.0077)
(diesel) w3t × 1(j∈Spring) 0.00149 (0.0056) -0.00907 (0.0058) 0.0027 (0.00909)
(oil) w4t ×1(j∈Mineral) 0.00671 (0.0061) -0.0121 (0.00635) -1.06e-14 (0.010)
(oil) w4t × 1(j∈Spring) -0.00551 (0.0071) 0.0121 (0.00743) -0.00293 (0.0116)
(packaging) w5t ×1(j∈Mineral) -0.00185 (0.0070) 0.00571 (0.0073) -1.45e-15 (0.011)
(packaging) w5t × 1(j∈Spring) -0.00618 (0.0082) -0.00571 (0.0085) -0.0111 (0.0133)
ςjt−1 (mineral water) -0.0471 (0.0279) 0.535 (.0289) 2.65e-15 (0.045)
ςjt−1 (spring water) 0.0311 (0.0328) -0.535 (.034) 0.209 (0.053)
Product fixed effects not shown
F (53, 1808) test, (p-value) 122.18 (0.00) 298.30 (0.00) 202.06 (0.00)
Table 11 : First Stage Regressions for the Demand Estimation
7.6 Estimates of cost equations
Here, we present the empirical results of the estimation of the cost equation (19) for
h = 1, ..., 14 that is
lnChjt = ωhj +Wjtλg + ln ηhjt
where variables Wjt include time dummies δt, wages, oil, diesel, packaging material and
plastic price variables interacted with the dummy variable for spring water (SW ) and
mineral water (MW ).
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Coefficients (Std. err.)
lnChjt salary×SW salary×MW plastic×SW plastic×MW packaging×SW packaging×MW
Model 1 -0.316 (0.032) -0.109 (0.025) -0.074 (0.014) -0.039 (0.012) 0.071 (0.011) 0.020 (0.009)
Model 2 -0.504 (0.042) -0.147 (0.032) -0.127 (0.018) -0.054 (0.015) 0.098 (0.014) 0.030 (0.012)
Model 3 -0.318 (0.041) -0.110 (0.030) -0.062 (0.018) -0.037 (0.014) 0.063 (0.013) 0.026 (0.011)
Model 4 0.040 (0.058) -0.175 (0.040) 0.090 (0.024) -0.055 (0.019) 0.000 (0.017) 0.039 (0.014)
Model 5 -0.021 (0.015) -0.008 (0.012) 0.001 (0.007) -0.009 (0.006) 0.002 (0.005) 0.006 (0.004)
Model 6 -0.036 (0.015) -0.009 (0.012) -0.001 (0.007) -0.010 (0.006) 0.005 (0.005) 0.006 (0.004)
Model 7 -0.107 (0.018) -0.042 (0.014) -0.020 (0.008) -0.020 (0.007) 0.020 (0.006) 0.013 (0.005)
Model 8 -0.165 (0.021) -0.057 (0.017) -0.035 (0.009) -0.024 (0.008) 0.034 (0.007) 0.014 (0.006)
Model 9 0.002 (0.013) 0.008 (0.010) 0.005 (0.006) -0.004 (0.005) -0.002 (0.004) 0.003 (0.004)
Model 10 -0.019 (0.014) -0.008 (0.011) 0.001 (0.006) -0.008 (0.005) 0.003 (0.005) 0.006 (0.004)
Model 11 -0.007 (0.013) -0.002 (0.011) 0.003 (0.006) -0.006 (0.005) -0.000 (0.005) 0.004 (0.004)
Model 12 -0.076 (0.014) -0.040 (0.011) -0.014 (0.006) -0.017 (0.005) 0.014 (0.005) 0.012 (0.004)
Model 13 -0.027 (0.014) -0.011 (0.011) -0.000 (0.006) -0.007 (0.005) 0.004 (0.005) 0.006 (0.004)
Model 14 -0.133 (0.015) -0.066 (0.012) -0.027 (0.007) -0.024 (0.006) 0.025 (0.005) 0.016 (0.004)
Table 12 : Cost Equations for the Multinomial Logit Model
Coefficients (Std. err.) All δt = 0 All ωgj = 0
lnChjt diesel×SW diesel×MW oil×SW oil×MW F test (p val.) F test (p val.)
Model 1 -0.013 (0.007) 0.006 (0.006) 0.040 (0.009) 0.007 (0.008) 8.01 (0.000) 274.39 (0.000)
Model 2 -0.003 (0.009) 0.007 (0.007) 0.043 (0.012) 0.008 (0.010) 5.80 (0.000) 189.82 (0.000)
Model 3 -0.027 (0.008) 0.004 (0.006) 0.058 (0.011) 0.008 (0.009) 3.35 (0.000) 250.34 (0.000)
Model 4 -0.061 (0.012) -0.004 (0.009) 0.058 (0.015) 0.024 (0.013) 2.08 (0.001) 218.02 (0.000)
Model 5 -0.005 (0.003) -0.000 (0.003) 0.011 (0.005) 0.003 (0.004) 1.67 (0.011) 783.26 (0.000)
Model 6 -0.005 (0.003) -0.000 (0.003) 0.012 (0.005) 0.003 (0.004) 1.72 (0.008) 796.10 (0.000)
Model 7 -0.006 (0.004) 0.001 (0.003) 0.018 (0.005) 0.004 (0.005) 2.64 (0.000) 729.80 (0.000)
Model 8 -0.009 (0.004) 0.003 (0.004) 0.024 (0.006) 0.004 (0.005) 3.47 (0.000) 599.76 (0.000)
Model 9 -0.004 (0.003) -0.001 (0.003) 0.007 (0.004) 0.002 (0.003) 1.29 (0.133) 560.97 (0.000)
Model 10 -0.005 (0.003) -0.000(0.002) 0.010 (0.004) 0.002 (0.004) 1.16 (0.251) 535.56 (0.000)
Model 11 -0.004 (0.003) -0.001 (0.002) 0.008 (0.004) 0.002 (0.003) 1.47 (0.045) 557.61 (0.000)
Model 12 -0.005 (0.003) 0.001 (0.002) 0.014 (0.004) 0.004 (0.004) 3.43 (0.000) 550.13 (0.000)
Model 13 -0.005 (0.003) -0.001 (0.002) 0.012 (0.004) 0.004 (0.003) 1.89 (0.002) 562.73 (0.000)
Model 14 -0.005 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003) 0.020 (0.004) 0.007 (0.004) 7.25 (0.000) 519.31 (0.000)
Table 12 (continued) : Cost Equations for the Multinomial Logit Model
Coefficients (Std. err.)
lnChjt salary×SW salary×MW plastic×SW plastic×MW packaging×SW packaging×MW
Model 1 -0.172 (0.023) -0.006 (0.018) -0.010 (0.010) 0.000 (0.008) -0.004 (0.010) -0.025 (0.009)
Model 2 -0.206 (0.025) -0.005 (0.020) -0.017 (0.011) -0.000 (0.008) -0.003 (0.011) -0.028 (0.010)
Model 3 -0.257 (0.028) -0.010 (0.022) -0.029 (0.012) -0.000 (0.009) -0.003 (0.012) -0.035 (0.010)
Model 4 0.027 (0.036) -0.046 (0.025) 0.062 (0.014) -0.003 (0.011) -0.037 (0.014) -0.024 (0.012)
Model 5 -0.007 (0.013) 0.004 (0.010) 0.011 (0.006) 0.000 (0.004) -0.003 (0.006) 0.000 (0.005)
Model 6 -0.006 (0.019) 0.004 (0.015) 0.017 (0.008) -0.003 (0.006) -0.010 (0.0081) 0.002 (0.007)
Model 7 -0.015 (0.014) -0.002 (0.011) 0.010 (0.006) 0.001 (0.005) -0.005 (0.006) -0.002 (0.005)
Model 8 -0.018 (0.016) 0.012 (0.013) 0.011 (0.007) 0.006 (0.005) -0.005 (0.007) -0.005 (0.006)
Model 9 0.000 (0.012) 0.005 (0.010) 0.008 (0.005) -0.001 (0.004) -0.001 (0.005) 0.002 (0.005)
Model 10 -0.004 (0.014) -0.006 (0.011) 0.005 (0.006) -0.004 (0.005) 0.001 (0.006) 0.006 (0.005)
Model 11 -0.003 (0.012) 0.004 (0.010) 0.009 (0.005) 0.000 (0.004) -0.003 (0.005) 0.001 (0.005)
Model 12 -0.031 (0.015) -0.007 (0.011) 0.006 (0.006) -0.001 (0.005) -0.005 (0.006) -0.004 (0.006)
Model 13 -0.008 (0.013) 0.002 (0.011) 0.010 (0.006) 0.000 (0.004) -0.000 (0.006) 0.001 (0.005)
Model 14 -0.097(0.018) -0.008 (0.014) 0.001 (0.007) 0.003 (0.006) -0.006 (0.007) -0.019 (0.007)
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Table 13 : Cost Equations for the Nested Logit Model
Coefficients (Std. err.) All δt = 0 All ωgj = 0
lnChjt diesel×SW diesel×MW oil×SW oil×MW F test (p val.) F test (p val.)
Model 1 0.013 (0.005) 0.014 (0.004) 0.000 (0.007) -0.010 (0.006) 5.38 (0.000) 300.63 (0.000)
Model 2 0.017 (0.005) 0.016 (0.005) -0.001 (0.008) -0.013 (0.006) 5.48 (0.000) 274.99 (0.000)
Model 3 0.024 (0.006) 0.020 (0.005) -0.005 (0.008) -0.016 (0.007) 6.01 (0.000) 244.69 (0.000)
Model 4 -0.010 (0.008) 0.015 (0.006) 0.007 (0.010) -0.006 (0.008) 3.13 (0.000) 233.37 (0.000)
Model 5 -0.002 (0.003) -0.001 (0.002) 0.005 (0.004) 0.003 (0.003) 1.09 (0.345) 495.72 (0.000)
Model 6 -0.001 (0.004) -0.001 (0.003) 0.006 (0.006) 0.002 (0.005) 1.02 (0.435) 276.84(0.000)
Model 7 -0.000 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003) 0.004 (0.004) 0.002 (0.004) 1.21 (0.200) 473.69 (0.000)
Model 8 0.001 (0.004) -0.000 (0.003) 0.002 (0.005) 0.002 (0.004) 1.23 (0.190) 383.82 (0.000)
Model 9 -0.003 (0.003) 0.002 (0.002) 0.006 (0.004) 0.003 (0.003) 1.08 (0.356) 473.31 (0.000)
Model 10 -0.005 (0.003) -0.002 (0.003) 0.008 (0.004) 0.003 (0.004) 0.84 (0.707) 236.63 (0.000)
Model 11 -0.002 (0.003) -0.001 (0.002) 0.005 (0.004) 0.003 (0.003) 1.13 (0.287) 490.63 (0.000)
Model 12 -0.000 (0.003) 0.002 (0.003) 0.002 (0.003) 0.006 (0.004) 1.97 (0.002) 298.09 (0.000)
Model 13 -0.004 (0.003) -0.001 (0.003) 0.007 (0.004) 0.003 (0.003) 1.18 (0.238) 452.71 (0.000)
Model 14 0.006 (0.004) 0.009 (0.003) 0.006 (0.005) -0.006 (0.005) 6.33 (0.000) 350.49 (0.000)
Table 13 (continued) : Cost Equations for the Nested Logit Model
7.7 Additional non nested tests
Vuong (1989) Test Statistic
Â H2
H1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 3.74 3.34 8.01 -4.96 -4.93 -4.10 -2.78 -5.396 -6.02 -5.62 -5.64
2 1.70 5.77 -7.10 -7.16 -6.32 -4.93 -7.67 -8.23 -7.82 -7.84
3 6.46 -7.01 -7.08 -6.17 -5.74 -7.52 -8.21 -7.77 -7.78
4 -12.93 -13.16 -11.84 -11.38 -13.54 -14.51 -13.89 -13.90
5 0.56 13.18 4.39 -2.03 -12.23 -7.81 -9.29
6 7.77 4.92 -2.58 -11.29 -7.07 -6.67
7 2.51 -11.99 -15.53 -13.27 -14.69
8 -5.06 -6.58 -5.77 -5.67
9 -12.00 -7.30 -7.23
10 14.26 12.21
11 0.46
Table 14 : Results of the Vuong Test for the Multinomial Logit Model
Vuong (1989) Test Statistic
Â H2
H1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 9.17 7.68 7.98 -15.49 -1.06 -14.98 -3.95 -15.35 -15.65 -11.21 -13.57
2 6.64 6.88 -15.46 -1.39 -14.96 -4.62 -14.65 -15.78 -11.70 -13.98
3 5.46 -14.46 -1.79 -13.96 -5.32 -12.57 -14.98 -11.56 -13.47
4 -14.94 -2.44 -14.55 -6.55 -12.10 -15.30 -12.35 -14.54
5 1.58 12.88 2.09 12.51 -11.47 5.49 0.47
6 -1.35 -0.64 -0.27 -1.91 -1.13 -1.54
7 1.56 11.04 -12.97 2.49 -2.15
8 0.98 -2.85 -1.02 -1.96
9 -13.55 -7.40 -9.59
10 10.86 4.56
11 -3.63
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Table 15 : Results of the Vuong Test for the Nested Logit Model
7.8 Formulas
Price elasticity of product j market share with respect to price of product k :
ηjk ≡
∂sj
∂pk
pk
sj
=
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
α
1−σg pk[σgsj/g + (1− σg)sj − 1] if j = k and {j, k} ∈ g
α
1−σg pk[σgsk/g + (1− σg)sk] if j 6= k and {j, k} ∈ g
αpksk if j ∈ g and k ∈ g0 and g 6= g0
Price elasticities of group g market share with respect to product k :
ηgk ≡
∂sg
∂pk
pk
sg
==
½
αpksg0sk/g0 if k ∈ g0 and g 6= g0
αpksk/g(sg − 1) if k ∈ g
Price elasticities of firm f manufacturer’s total market share with respect to product
k :
ηfk ≡
∂sf
∂pk
pk
sf
=
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
α
1−σg pk[σgsk/g + (1− σg)sk]−
α
1−σg
sk
sFf
pk if k ∈ Ff
α
1−σg pk[σgsk/g + (1− σg)sk] if k 6∈ Ff and {Ff , k} ∈ g
αpksk if k 6∈ Ff and Ff ∈ g and k ∈ g0
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